In addition to these treaty provisions, which dealt directly with the issue of verification, counting and distinction rules, as well as certain constraints on certain systems, they were included in the agreement specifically for verification purposes. Joint Declaration. Each Party shall have the right, by initial construction or, by way of derogation from paragraph 1 of Article VIII, by conversion to cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometres or to ASBM, to equip up to sixteen aircraft, including prototype bomber aircraft equipped with such missiles. Each Party shall also have the right, by way of derogation from article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, to test cruise missiles with a range exceeding 600 kilometres from such aircraft and, after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, to test them also on such aircraft from ASBM; unless the Parties agree that they will no longer test ASBMs after that date. The restrictions laid down in Article III of the Treaty shall not apply to such aircraft. The above aircraft can only include the following: A restriction included for verification purposes was a ban on the production, testing and use of the Soviet SS-16 ICBM. The missile appeared to share a number of components with the Soviet SS-20, a medium-range ballistic missile (IRBM). Given that the parties had agreed that land-based ballistic missile launchers other than intercontinental ballistic missiles should not be converted into intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, the United States requested this ban on the SS-16 in order to avoid verification problems that might have arisen during the further development of the SS-16 program, because in that case, the distinction between the SS-16 and SS-20 missions would have been very difficult. Even after the Vladivostok Agreements, the two nations could not resolve the other two open issues of SALT I: the number of strategic bombers and the total number of warheads in each nation`s arsenal.

The first was complicated by the Soviet bomber, which American negotiators thought could reach the United States, but which the Soviets did not want to include in the SALT negotiations. Meanwhile, the Soviets tried unsuccessfully to restrict U.S. use of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). The verification also separated the two countries, but they eventually agreed on the use of national technical means (NTM), including the collection of electronic signals known as telemetry and the use of photo reconnaissance satellites. On 17 June 1979, Carter and Brezhnev sign the SALT II Treaty in Vienna. SALT II limited the total number of nuclear forces of the two countries to 2,250 launchers and imposed a host of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces, including MIRVs. Of the resulting set of agreements (SALT I), the most important were the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement and Protocol on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons. Both were developed by Pres.

Richard M. Nixon for the United States and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for the USSR signed on 26 May 1972 at a summit meeting in Moscow. In accordance with Article VII of SALT I, the parties began negotiations in November 1972 on new restrictions on strategic offensive weapons. The main objective of SALT II was to replace the Interim Agreement with a comprehensive, long-term treaty on general restrictions on strategic offensive weapons. The parties discussed the types of weapons to be included, bans on new systems, qualitative restrictions, the inclusion of FORWARD-based US systems in the treaty, etc. In November 1974, the parties arrived at a basic framework for SALT II, which included: On November 26, 1974, the parties obtained the following: In May 1986, President Reagan stated that he had reviewed the state of U.S. interim policy and that, as he had documented in three detailed reports to Congress, the Soviet Union had not fulfilled its political commitment to comply with the SALT agreements. The President. The next item is the joint debate on the following motions for resolutions: In future, the United States will have to base its decisions on its strategic force structure on the nature and extent of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on the standards contained in the SALT structure.

In his statement, President Reagan said he did not expect significant growth in the number of U.S. strategic offensive forces and that unless the threat changed significantly, the U.S. would not deploy more strategic nuclear launchers or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviets. The United States would like, in short, .” continue to exercise maximum restraint while protecting strategic deterrence in order to create the atmosphere necessary for a significant reduction in the strategic arsenals of both sides. He again called on the Soviet Union to join the United States. by creating a preliminary framework of genuine mutual restraint”. On May 27, President Reagan announced that the United States would no longer adhere to the treaty boundaries. The president said that the USSR was not fulfilling its political commitment to comply with the provisions of the treaty and was not showing its willingness to conclude new arms reduction agreements. He went on to say that the United States would base its decisions on its strategic force structure on the nature and extent of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on the standards contained in the SALT structure. He explained that the US would not use more SNDVs or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the USSR to protect strategic deterrence. 1.

In order to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally accepted principles of international law. .